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15th < 5NATE. C Rep. Com. 

m f*°*s{<yn. > ) No. 351. 



1783 
U57 
opy 2 




IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. 



January 24, 1859.— Ordered to be printed. 



Mr. Slidell made the following 

REPORT. 

[To accompany Bill S. 497.] 

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to loliom ivas referred the bill 
(S. 497) "making appropriations to facilitate the acquisition of the 
island of Cuba, by negotiation," have had the same under considera- 
tion, and now respectfully report: 

It is not considered necessary b) T your committee to enlarge upon 
the vast importance of the acquisition of the island of Cuba by the 
United States. To do so would be as much a work of supererogation 
as to demonstrate an elementary problem in mathematics, or one of 
those axioms of ethics or philosophy which have been universally 
received for ages. The ultimate acquisition of Cuba may be consid- 
1 a fixed purpose of the United States, a purpose resulting from 
political and geographical necessities which have been recognized by 
all parties and all administrations, and in regard to which the pojmlar 
voire has been expressed with a unanimity unsurpassed on any ques- 
tion of national policy that has heretofore engaged the public mind. 

The purchase and annexation of Louisiana led, as a necessary 
corollary, to that of Florida, and both point with unerring certainty 
to the acquisition of Cuba. The sparse and feeble population of what 
is now the great west called in 1800 for the free navigation of the 
Mississippi, and the enforcement of the right of deposit at New Or- 
leans. In three years not only were these privileges secured, but 
the whole of the magnificent domain of Louisiana was ours. Who 
now doubts the wisdom of a measure which at the time was denounced 
with a violence until then unparalleled in our political history? 

From the day -we acquired Louisiana the attention of our ablest 
statesmen was fixed on Cuba. What the possession of the mouth of 
the Mississippi had been to the people of the west that of Cuba 
became to the nation. To cast the eye upon the map was sufficient 
to predict its destiny. A brief reference will show the importance 
attached to the question by our leading statesmen, and the steadiness 
and perseverance with which they have endeavored to hasten the 
consummation of so vital a measure. 



ACQUISITION OF CUBA. ' 



Mr. Jefferson in a letter to President Madison, of the 27th of 
April, 1809, speaking of the policy that Napoleon would probably 
pursue towards us, says: 

"He ought to be satisfied with having forced her (Great Britain) 
to revoke the orders on which he pretended to retaliate, and to be 
particularly satisfied with us, by whose unyielding adherence to prin- 
ciple she has been forced into the revocation. He ought the more to 
conciliate our good will, as we can be such an obstacle to the new 
career opening on him in the Spanish colonies. That he would give 
us the Floridas to withhold intercourse with the residue of those colo- 
nies cannot be doubted. But that is no price, because they are ours 
in the first moment of the first war, and until a war they are of no 
particular necessity to us. But, although with difficulty, he will 
consent to our receiving Cuba into our Union, to prevent our aid to 
Mexico and the other provinces. That would be a price, and I 
would immediately erect a column on the southernmost limit of Cuba 
and inscribe on it a ne plus ultra as to us in that direction. We 
should then have only to include the north in our confederacy, which 
would be, of course, in the first war, and we should have such an 
empire for liberty as she has never surveyed since the creation; and 
I am persuaded no constitution was ever before so well calculated as 
ours for extensive empire and self-government. * * 

"It will be objected to our receiving Cuba that no limit can then 
be drawn to our future acquisitions. Cuba can be defended by us 
without a navy, and this develops the principle which ought to limit 
our views. Nothing should ever be accepted which would require a 
navy to defend it. 7 ' 

Again, in writing to President Monroe on the 23d June, 1823, he 
says: "For certainly her addition to our confederacy is exactly what 
is wanting to advance our power as a nation to the point of its utmost 
interest." 

And in another letter to the same, on the 24th October, 1823, he 
says : 

"I candidly confess that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most 
interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of States. 
The control which, with Florida Point, this island would give us over 
the Gulf of Mexico, and the countries and isthmus bordering on it, 
would fill up the measure of our political well being." 

John Quincy Adams while Secretary of State under Mr. Monroe, 
in a despatch to Mr. Nelson, our minister at Madrid, of the 28th April, 
1823, says: 

"In the war between France and Spain, now commencing, other 
interests, peculiarly ours, will in all probability be deeply involved. 
Whatever may be the issue of this war as between those two Euro- 
pean powers, it may be taken for granted that the dominion of Spain 
upon the American continents, north and south, is irrecoverably gone. 
But the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico still remain nominally and so 
far really dependent upon her, that she yet possesses the power of 
transferring her own dominion over them, together with the possession 
of them, to others. These islands, from their local position and 



ACQUISITION OF CUBA. 3 

natural appendages to the North American continent, and one of them, 
Culm, almost in sight of our shores, from a multitude of considera- 
tions, has become an object of transcendent importance to the com- 
mercial and political interests of our Union. Its commanding position, 
with reference to the Gulf of Mexico and the West India seas, the 
character of its population, its situation midway between our south- 
ern coast and the island of St. Domingo, its safe and capacious harbor 
of the Havana, fronting a long line of our shores destitute of the same 
advantage, the nature of its productions and of its wants, furnishing 
the supplies and needing the returns of a commerce immensely profit- 
able and mutually beneficial, give it an importance in the sum of our 
national interests with which that of no other foreign territory can be 

apared and little inferior to that which binds the different members 
<>fthis Union together. Such, indeed, are, between the interests of that 
island and of this country, the geographical, commercial, moral, and 
political relations formed by nature, gathering in the process of time, 
and even now verging to maturity, that, in looking forward to the 
probable course of events, for the short period of half a century, it is 
Bcarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba 
to our federal republic will be indispensable to the continuance and 
integrity of the Union itself. It is obvious, however, that for this 
event we are not yet prepared. Numerous and formidable objections 
to the extension of our territorial dominions beyond sea, present 
themselves to the first contemplation of the subject: obstacles to the 
system of policy by which alone that result can be compassed and 
maintained, are to be foreseen and surmounted, both from at home 
and abroad; but there are laws of political as well as of physical 
gravitation; and if an apple, severed by the tempest from its native 

s, cannot choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined 
from its own unnatural connexion with Spain, and incapable of self- 
support, can gravitate only towards the North American Union, 
which, by the same law of nature, cannot cast her off from its bosom. 

"The transfer of Cuba to Great Britain would be an event unpro- 
pitious to the interests of this Union. This opinion is so generally 
entertained, that even the groundless rumors that it was about to be 
accomplished, which have spread abroad, and are still teeming, may 
be traced to the deep and almost universal feeling of aversion to it, 
and to the alarm which the mere probability of its occurrence has 
stimulated. The question both of our right and of our power to 
prevent it, if necessary by force, already obtrudes itself upon our 
councils, and the administration is called upon, in the performance of 
its duties to the nation, at least to use all the means within its com- 
petency to guard against and forefend it." 

On April 27, 1825, Mr. Clay, Secretary of State, in a despatch to 
Mr. A. H. Everett, our minister at Madrid, instructing him to use 
his exertions to induce Spain to make peace with her revolted colo- 
nies, says: 

"The United States are satisfied with the present condition of 
those islands (Cuba and Porto Rico) in the hands of Spain, and with 
their ports open to our commerce, as they are now open. This gov- 



4 ACQUISITION OF CUBA. 

ernment desires no political change of that condition. The popula- 
tion itself of the islands is incompetent at present, from its compo- 
sition and its amount, to maintain self-government. The maritime 
force of the neighboring republics of Mexico and Colombia is not 
now, nor is it likely shortly to be, adequate to the protection of those 
islands, if the conquest of them were effected. The United States 
would entertain constant apprehensions of their passing from their 
possession to that of some less friendly sovereignty; and of all 
the European powers, this country prefers that Cuba and Porto 
Rico should remain dependent on Spain. If the war should 
continue between Spain and the new republics, and those islands 
should become the object and the theatre of it, their fortunes have 
such a connexion with the prosperity of the United States that they 
could not be indifferent spectators; and the possible contingencies of 
such a protracted war might bring upon the government of the 
United States duties and obligations the performance of which, how- 
ever painful it should be, they might not be at liberty to decline." 

Mr. Van Buren, writing to Mr. Yan Ness, our minister to Spain, 
October 2, 1829, says: 

' ' The government of the United States has always looked with 
the deepest interest upon the fate of those islands, but particularly 
of Cuba. Its geographical position, which places it almost in sight 
of our southern shores, and, as it were, gives it the command of the 
Gulf of Mexico and the West India seas, its safe and capacious 
harbors, its rich productions, the exchange of which, for our surplus 
agricultural products and manufactures, constitutes one of the most 
extensive and valuable branches of our foreign trade, render it of 
the utmost importance to the United States that no change should 
take place in its condition which might injuriously affect our political 
and commercial standing in that quarter. Other considerations, con- 
nected with a certain class of our population, make it the interest of 
the southern section of the Union that no attempt should be made in 
that island to throw off the yoke of Spanish dependence, the first 
effect of which would be the sudden emancipation of a numerous 
slave population, the result of which could not but be very sensibly 
felt upon the adjacent shores of the United States. On the other 
hand, the wisdom which induced the Spanish government to relax in 
its colonial system, and to adopt with regard to those islands a more 
liberal policy which opened their ports to general commerce, has 
been so far satisfactory in the view of the United States as, in addition 
to other considerations, to induce this government to desire that their 
possession should not be transferred from the Spanish crown to any 
other power. In conformity with this desire, the ministers of the 
United States at Madrid have, from time to time, been instructed 
attentively to watch the course of events and the secret springs of 
European diplomacy, which, from information received from various 
quarters, this government had reason to suspect had been put in 
motion to effect the transfer of the possession of Cuba to the power- 
ful allies of Spain. 

' ' You are authorized to say that the long established and well known 



ACQUISITION OF CUBA. 5 

policy of the United States, which forbids their entangling themselves 
m the concerns of other nations, and which permits their physical 
■ to be used only for the defence of their political rights and the 
protection of the persons and property of their citizens, equally 
forbids their public agents to enter into positive engagements, the 
performance of which would require the employment of means which 
the people have retained in their own hands ; but that this govern- 
ment has every reason to believe that the same influence which once 
averted the blow ready to fall upon the Spanish islands would again 
be found effectual on the recurrence of similar events ; and that the 
high preponderance in American affairs of the United States as a 
great naval power, the influence which they must at all times com- 
mand as a great commercial nation, in all questions involving the 
interests of the general commerce of this hemisphere, would render 
their consent an essential preliminary to the execution of any project 
calculated so vitally to affect the general concerns of all the nations 
in any degree engaged in the commerce of America. The knowledge 
you possess of the public sentiment of this country in regard to Cuba 
will enable you to speak with confidence and effect of the probable 
consequences that might be expected from the communication of that 
sentiment to Congress, in the event of any contemplated change in 
the present political condition of that island. " 

And again, on the 13th of October, 1830: "This government has 
also been given to understand that, if Spain should persevere in the 
assertion of a hopeless claim to dominion over her former colonies, 
they will feel it to be their duty, as well as their interest, to attack 
her colonial possessions in our vicinity, Cuba and Porto Rico. Your 
general instructions are full upon the subject of the interest which 
the United States take in the fate of those islands, and particularly 
of the former; they inform you that we are content that Cuba should 
remain as it now is, but could not consent to its transfer to any Euro- 
pean {lower. Motives of reasonable state policy render it more desir- 
able to us that it should remain subject to Spain rather than to either 
of the South American States. Those motives will readily present 
themselves to your mind; they are principally founded upon an appre- 
hension that, if possessed by the latter, it would, in the present state 
of things, be in greater danger of becoming subject to some European 
power than in its present condition. Although such are our own 
wishes and true interests, the President does not see on what ground 
he would be justified in interfering with any attempts which the 
South American States might think it for their interest, in the prose- 
cution of a defensive war, to make upon the islands in question. If, 
indeed, an attempt should be made to disturb them, by putting arms 
in the hands of one portion of their population to destroy another, 
and which in its influence would endanger the peace of a portion of 
the United States, the case might be different. Against such an 
attempt the United States (being informed that it was in contempla- 
tion) have already protested and warmly remonstrated, in their com- 
munications last summer with the government of Mexico; but the 
information lately communicated to us in this regard was accompanied 



6 ACQUISITION OF CUBA. 

by a solemn assurance that no such measures will, in any event, be re- 
sorted to; and that the contest, if forced upon them, will be carried 
on, on their part, with strict reference to the established rules of civil- 
ized warfare." 

Mr. Buchanan, in his despatch to Mr. R. M. Saunders, of June 17, 
1848, said: "With these considerations in view, the President 
believes that the crisis has arrived when an effort should be made to 
purchase the island of Cuba lrom Spain, and he has determined to 
intrust you Avith the performance of this most delicate and important 
duty. The attempt should be made, in the first instance, in a confi- 
dential conversation with the Spanish minister for foreign affairs; a 
written offer might produce an absolute refusal in writing, which 
would embarrass us hereafter in the acquisition of the island. Besides, 
from the incessant changes in the Spanish cabinet and policy, our 
desire to make the purchase might thus be made known in an official 
form to foreign governments, and arouse their jealousy and active 
opposition. Indeed, even if the present cabinet should think favor- 
ably of the proposition, they might be greatly embarrassed by having 
it placed on record; for in that event it would almost certainly, through 
some channel, reach the opposition and become the subject of discus- 
sion in the Cortes. Such delicate negotiations, at least in their 
incipient stages, ought always to be conducted in confidential conver- 
sation, and with the utmost secrecy and despatch." 

' ' At your interview with the minister for foreign affairs you might 
introduce the subject by referring to the present distracted condition of 
Cuba, and the danger which exists that the population will make an 
attempt to accomplish a revolution. This must be well known to the 
Spanish government. In order to convince him of the good faith and 
friendship towards Spain with which this government has acted, you 
might read to him the first part of my despatch to General Campbell, 
and the order issued by the Secretar}^ of War to the commanding gen- 
eral in Mexico and to the officer having charge of the embarkation of 
our troops at Vera Cruz. You may then touch delicately upon the 
danger that Spain may lose Cuba by a revolution in the island, or that 
it may be wrested from her by Great Britain, should a rupture take 
place between the two countries arising out of the dismissal of Sir 
Henry Bulwer, and be retained to pay the Spanish debt due to the 
British bond-holders. You might assure him that, whilst this govern- 
ment is entirely satisfied that Cuba shall remain under the dominion 
of Spain, we should in any event resist its acquisition by any other 
nation. And, finally, you might inform him that, under all these 
circumstances, the President had arrived at the conclusion that Spain 
might be willing to transfer the island to the United States for a fair 
and full consideration. You might cite as a precedent the cession of 
Louisiana to this country by Napoleon, under somewhat similar cir- 
cumstances, when he was at the zenith of his power and glory. I 
have merely presented these topics in their natural order, and you 
can fill up the outline from the information communicated in this 
despatch, as well as from your own knowledge of the subject. Should 
the minister for foreign affairs lend a favorable ear to your proposi- 



ACQUISITION OF CUBA. 7 

tion, then the question of the consideration to be paid would arise, 
and you have been furnished with information in this despatch which 
will enable you to discuss that question. 

"The President would be willing to stipulate for the payment of one 
hundred millions of dollars. This, however, is the maximum price; 
and if Spain should be willing to sell, you will use your best efforts 
to purchase it at a rate as much below that sum as practicable. In 
case you should be able to conclude a treaty, you may adopt as your 
model, so far as the same may be applicable, the two conventions of 
April 30, 1803, between France and the United States, for the sale 
and purchase of Louisiana. The seventh and eighth articles of the 
first of these conventions ought, if possible, to be omitted; still, if 
this should be indispensable to the accomplishment of the object, 
articles similar to them may be retained." 

Mr. Ever-ett, in his celebrated letter of December 1, 1852, to the 
Compte ile Sartiges, rejecting the joint proposition of the French and 
British governments for a tripartite convention with the United States, 
disclaiming, severally and collectively, all intention to obtain possession 
of the island of Cuba, and respectively binding themselves to dis- 
countenance all attempts to that effect on the part of any power or 
individuals whatever, said: 

"Spain, meantime, has retained of her extensive dominions in this 
hemisphere but the two islands of Cuba and Porto Rico. A respect- 
ful sympathy with the fortunes of an ancient ally and a gallant people, 
with whom the United States have ever maintained the most friendly 
relations, would, if no other reason existed, make it our duty to leave 
her in the undisturbed possession of this little remnant of her mighty 
trans-Atlantic empire. The President desires to do so. No word or 
deed of his will ever question her title or shake her possession. But 
can it be expected to last very long? Can it resist this mighty cur- 
rent in the fortunes of the world ? Is it desirable that it should do 
so? Can it be for the interest of Spain to cling to a possession that 
can only be maintained by a garrison of twenty-five or thirty thousand 
troops, a powerful naval force, and an annual expenditure for both arms 
of the service of at least twelve millions of dollars? Cuba, at this 
moment, costs more to Spain than the entire naval and military estab- 
lishment of the United States costs the federal government. So far from 
being really injured by the loss of this island, there is no doubt that, 
were it peacefully transferred to the United States, a prosperous com- 
merce between Cuba and Spain, resulting from ancient associations 
and common language and tastes, would be far more productive than 
the best contrived system of colonial taxation. Such, notoriously, 
has been the result to Great Britain of the establishment of the 
independence of the United States. The decline of Spain from the 
position which she held in the time of Charles the Fifth is coeval with 
the foundation of her colonial system; while within twenty-five years, 
and since the loss of most of her colonies, she has entered upon a 
course of rapid improvement unknown since the abdication of that 
emperor." 






8 ACQUISITION OF CUBA. 

Mr. Marcy, in his despatch of July 23, 1853, to Mr. Pierre Soule 
says : 

"Sir : There are circumstances in the affairs of Spain, having a con- 
nexion with this country, which give unusual importance at this time 
to the mission to that government. The proximity of her remaining 
possessions in this hemisphere — the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico — 
to the United States, the present condition of the former, and the 
rumors of contemplated changes in its internal affairs, complicate 
our relations with Spain. The island of Cuba, on account of its mag- 
nitude, situation, fine climate, and rich productions, far superior in 
all respects to any in the West India group, is a very desirable pos- 
session to Spain, and, for the same reasons, very difficult for her to 
retain in its present state of dependence. The opinion generally 
prevails among the European nations that the Spanish dominion over 
it is insecure. This was clearly evinced by the alacrity with which 
both England and France, on occasion of the late disturbances in Cuba, 
volunteered their aid to sustain the Spanish rule over it, and by their 
recent proposition to the United States for a tripartite convention to 
guaranty its possession to Spain. Without an essential change in 
her present policy, such a change as she will most likely be unwilling 
to make, she cannot, it is confidently believed, long sustain, unaided, 
her present connexion with that island. 

"What will be its destiny after it shall cease to be a dependency of 
Spain is a question with which some of the principal powers of 
Europe have seen fit to concern themselves, and in which the United 
States have a deep and direct interest. 

"I had occasion recently, in preparing instructions for our minister 
to London, to present the views of the President in relation to the 
interference of Great Britain, as well as of France, in * * 
* * Cuban affairs. To spare myself the labor of again going 
over the same ground, I herewith furnish you with an extract from 
those instructions. 

"The policy of the government of the United States in regard to 
Cuba, in any contingency calling for our interposition, will depend, in 
a great degree, upon the peculiar circumstances of the case, and can- 
not, therefore, now be presented with much precision beyond what is 
indicated in the instructions before referred to. Nothing will be done, 
on our part, to disturb its present connexion with Spain, unless the 
character of that connexion should be so changed as to affect our 
present or prospective security. While the United States would resist, 
at every hazard, the transference of Cuba to any European nation, 
they would exceedingly regret to see Spain resorting to any power for 
assistance to uphold her rule over it. Such a dependence on foreign 
aid would, in effect, invest the auxiliary with the character of a pro- 
tector, and give it a pretext to interfere in our affairs, and also gen- 
erally in those of the North American continent. In case of collision 
with the United States, such protecting power would be in a condition 
to make nearly the same use of that island to annoy us as it could do 
if it were the absolute possessor of it.. 

"Our minister at Madrid, during the administration of President 
Polk, was instructed to ascertain if Spain was disposed to transfer 



ACQUISITION OF CUBA. 9 

Cuba to the United States for a liberal pecuniary consideration. I do 
not understand, however, that it was at that time the policy of this 
government to acquire that island unless its inhabitants were very 
generally disposed to concur in the transfer. Under certain conditions 
the United States might be willing to purchase it ; but it is scarcely 
expected that you will find Spain, should you attempt to ascertain her 
views upon the subject, at all inclined to enter into such a negotiation. 
There is reason to believe that she is under obligations to Great 
Britain and France not to transfer this island to the United States. 
Were there nothing else to justify this belief but the promptness with 
which these two powers sent their naval forces to her aid in the late 
Cuban disturbances, the proposition for a tripartite convention to 
guaranty Cuba to Spain, and, what is more significant than either 
of the above facts, the sort of joint protest by England and France, 
to which I adverted in my instructions to Mr. Buchanan, against some 
of the views presented in Mr. Everett's letter of the 2d of December 
last to Mr. Sartiges, the French minister, would alone be satisfactory 
proof of such an arrangement. Independent of any embarrassment 
of this nature, there are many other reasons for believing that Spain 
will pertinaciously hold on to Cuba, and that the separation, whenever 
it takes place, will be the work of violence." 

From these and other extracts that might be presented it is mani- 
fest that the ultimate acquisition of Cuba has long been regarded as 
the fixed policy of the United States — necessary to the progressive 
development of our system. All agree that the end is not only 
desirable but inevitable. The only difference of opinion is as to the 
time, mode, and conditions of obtaining it. 

The law of our national existence is growth. We cannot, if we 
would, disobey it. While we should do nothing to stimulate it 
unnaturally, we should be careful not to impose upon ourselves a regi- 
men so strict as to prevent its healthful development. The tendency 
of the age is the expansion of the great powers of the world. Eng- 
land, France, and Russia, all demonstrate the existence of this per- 
vading principle. Their growth, it is true, only operates by the 
absorption, partial or total, of weaker powers — generally, of inferior 
races. So long as this extension of territory is the result of geograph- 
ical position, a higher civilization, and greater aptitude for govern- 
ment, and is not pursued in a direction to endanger our safety or 
impede our progress, we have neither the right nor the disposition 
to find fault with it. Let England pursue her march of conquest and 
annexation in India, France extend her dominions on the southern 
shores of the Mediterranean, and advance her frontiers to the Rhine, 
or Russia subjugate her barbarous neighbors in Asia ; we shall look 
upon their progress, if not with favor, at least with indifference. We 
claim on this hemisphere the same privilege that they exercise on the 
other — 

" Hanc veniam petimusqne damusque vicissim." 

In this they are but obeying the laws of their organization. When 
they cease to grow they will soon commence that period of decadence 
which is the fate of all nations as of individual man. 

The question of the annexation of Cuba to the United States, we 



J 



10 ACQUISITION OF CUBA. 

repeat, is a question but of time. The fruit that was not ripe when 
John Quincy Adams penned his despatch to Mr. Forsyth, (it has not 
yet been severed by violence from its native tree, as he anticipated,) 
is now mature. Shall it be plucked by a friendly hand, prepared to 
compensate its proprietor with a princely guerdon ? or shall it fall 
decaying to the ground? 

As Spain cannot long maintain her grasp on this distant colony, 
there are but three possible alternatives in the future of Cuba : First, 
possession by one of the great European powers. This we have 
declared to be incompatible with our safety, and have announced to 
the world that any attempt to consummate it will be resisted by all 
the means in our power. When first we made this declaration we 
were comparatively feeble. The struggle would have been fearful 
and unequal ; but we were prepared to make it at whatever hazard. 
That declaration has often been repeated since. With a population 
nearly tripled, our financial resources and our means, offensive and 
defensive, increased in an infinitely larger proportion, we cannot 
now shrink from an issue that all were then ready to meet. 

The second alternative is the independence of the island. This 
independence could only be nominal ; it never could be maintained 
in fact. It would eventually fall under some protectorate, open or 
disguised. If under ours, annexation would soon follow as certainly 
as the shadow follows the substance. An European protectorate could 
not be tolerated. The closet philanthropists of England and France 
would, as the price of their protection, insist upon introducing theii 
schemes of emancipation. Civil and servile war would soon follow, 
and Cuba would present, as Hayti now does, no traces of its formei 
prosperity, but the ruins of its once noble mansions. Its uncontrolled 
possession by either France or England would be less dangerous and 
offensive to our southern States than a pretended independent black 
empire or republic. 

The third and last alternative is annexation to the United States. 
How and when is this to be effected ? By conquest or negotiation ? 
Conquest, even without the hostile interference of another European 
power than Spain, would be expensive, but with such interference 
would probably involve the whole civilized world in war, entail upon 
us the interruption, if not the loss, of our foreign trade, and an ex- 
penditure far exceeding any sum which it has ever been contemplated 
to offer for the purchase of Cuba. It would, besides, in all probability, 
lead to servile insurrection, and to the great injury or even total 
destruction of the industry of the island. Purchase, then, by nego- 
tiation seems to be the only practicable course ; and, in the opinion of 
the committee, that cannot be attempted with any reasonable prospect 
of success, unless the President be furnished with the means which he 
has suggested in his annual message, and which the bill proposes to 
give him. 

Much has been said of the danger of confiding such powers to the 
Executive, and from the fierceness with which the proposition has been 
denounced, it might be supposed that it was without precedent. So 
far is this from being the case, that we have three different acts upon 
the statute-book, placing large sums of money at the disposition of 



ACQUISITION OF CUBA. 11 

the President fur the purpose of aiding him in negotiations for the 
icquisition of territory. The first is the act of February 26, 1803. 
Although its object was well known, viz : to be used in negotiating 
for the purchase of Louisiana, the act does not indicate it. It placed 
two millions of dollars unreservedly at the disposition of the President, 
for the purpose of defraying any "extraordinary expense which may 
be incurred in the intercourse between the United States and foreign 
nations." Second. The act of February 13, 1806, using precisely 
ihe same phraseology, appropriates two millions of dollars, it being 
understood that it was to be used in negotiating for the purchase of 
Florida. 

The act of 3d March, 1847, " making further appropriation to bring 
he existing war with Mexico to a speedy and honorable conclusion," 
as been adopted as the model on which the present bill is framed. 
ts preamble states that " whereas, in the adjustment of so many com- 
licated questions as now exist between the two countries, it may 
ossibly happen that an expenditure of money will be called for by 
stipulations of any treaty which may be entered into, therefore 
le sum of three millions of dollars be, and the same is hereby, appro- 
l riated, to enable the President to conclude a treaty of peace, limits, 
• :id boundaries, with the republic of Mexico; to be used by him in the 
rent said treaty, when signed by the authorized agents of the two gov- 
mments and duly ratified by Mexico, shall call for the expenditure of 
I te same, or any part thereof." The bill now reported, appropriates, 
ader the same conditions, thirty millions of dollars to make a treaty 
ith Spain for the purchase of the island of Cuba. 
It will be perceived that this bill defines strictly the object to which 
ie amount appropriated shall be applied ; and in this respect allows 
- much narrower range of discretion to the present executive than 
the acts of 1803, and 1806, gave to Mr. Jefferson. In those cases the 
object of the appropriation was as well known to the country and to 
the world, as if it had been specifically stated. The knowledge of 
that fact did not then in the slightest degree tend to defeat the 
intended object, nor can it do so now. Under our form of government 
we have no state secrets. "With us, diplomacy has ceased to be envel- 
oped with the mysteries that of yore were considered inseparable from 
its successful exercise. Directness in our policy, and frankness in its 
avowal, are in conducting our foreign intercourse not less essential 
to the maintenance of our national character and the permanent 
interests of the republic than are the same qualities to social position 
and the advancement of honest enterprise in private life. 

Much has been said of the indelicacy of this mode of proceeding. 
That the offer to purchase will offend the Spanish pride, be regarded 
as an insult, and rejected with contempt. That instead of promoting 
a consummation that all admit to be desirable., it will have the oppo- 
site tendency. If this were true it would be a conclusive argument 
against the bill, but a brief consideration will show the fallacy of these 
views. For many years our desire to purchase Cuba has been known 
to the world. Seven years since President Fillmore communicated to 
Congress the instructions to our ministers on that subject, with all 
the correspondence connected with it. In that correspondence will 






12 ACQUISITION OF CUBA. 

be found three letters from Mr. Saunders, detailing conversations held 
with Narvaez and the minister of foreign relations, in which he noti- 
fied them of his authority to treat for the purchase of Cuba, and 
while the reply was so decided as to preclude him from making any 
direct proposition, yet no intimation was given that the suggestion 
was offensive. And why should it be so? We simply say to Spain, 
you have a distant possession, held by a precarious tenure, which is 
almost indispensable to us for the protection of our commerce, and 
may, from its peculiar position, the character of its population, and 
the mode in which it is governed, lead, at any time, to a rupture 
which both nations would deprecate. This possession, rich though 
it be in all the elements of wealth, yields to your treasury a net 
revenue not amounting, on the average of a series of years, to the 
hundredth part of the price we are prepared to give you for it. True, 
you have heretofore refused to consider our proposition, but circum- 
stances are changing daily. What may not have suited you in 1848 
may now be more acceptable. Should a war break out in Europe, 
Spain can scarcely hope to escape being involved in it. The people 
of Cuba naturally desire to have a voice in the government of the 
island. They may seize the occasion to proclaim their independence, 
and you may regret not having accepted the rich indemnity we offer. 

But even these arguments will not be pressed upon unwilling ears. 
Our minister will not broach the subject until he shall have good 
reason to believe that it will be favorably entertained. Such an op- 
portunity may occur when least expected. Spain is the country of 
coups-d'etat and pronunciamentos. The all-powerful minister of to- 
day may be a fugitive to-morrow. With the forms of a representative 
government, it is, in fact, a despotism sustained by the bayonet. A 
despotism tempered only by frequent, violent, and bloody revolutions . 
Her financial condition is one of extreme embarrassment. A crisis 
may arise when even the dynasty may be overthrown unless a large 
sum of money can be raised forthwith. Spain will be in the position 
of the needy possessor of land he cannot cultivate, having all the 
pride of one to whom it has descended through a long line of ancestry, 
but his necessities are stronger than his will; he must have money. 
A thrifty neighbor whose domains it will round off is at hand to fur- 
nish it. He retains the old mansion, but sells what will relieve him 
from immediate ruin. 

The President, in his annual message, has told us that we should 
not, if we could, acquire Cuba by any other means than honorable 
negotiation, unless circumstances which he does not anticipate render 
a departure from such a course justifiable, under the imperative and 
overruling law of self preservation. He also tells us that he desires 
to renew the negotiations, and it may become indispensable to success 
that he should be intrusted with the means for making an advance to 
the Spanish government immediately after the signing of the treaty, 
without awaiting the ratification of it by the Senate. This, in point 
of fact, is an appeal to Congress for an expression of its opinion on the 
propriety of renewing the negotiation. Should we fail to give him 
the means which may be indispensable to success, it may well be con- 



ACQUISITION OF CUBA. 13 

sidered by the President as an intimation that we do not desire the 
acquisition of the island. 

It has been asserted that the people of Cuba do not desire a transfer 
to the United States. If this were so it would present a very serious 
objection to the measure. The evidence on which it is based is, that on 
the receipt of the President's message, addresses were made by the 
municipal authorities of Havana, and other towns, protesting their 
devotion to the crown, and their hostility to the institutions of the 
United States. Any one who has had an opportunity of observing the 
persuasive influence of the bayonet in countries where it rules supreme 
will know how much value to attach to such demonstrations of popu- 
lar sentiment. There can be no doubt that an immense majority of 
the people of Cuba are not only in favor, but ardently desirous of 
annexation to the United States. It would be strange indeed, if they 
were not so; deprived of all influence even in the local affairs of the 
island — unrepresented in the Cortes — governed by successive hordes of 
hungry officials sent from the mother country to acquire fortunes to be 
enjoyed at home, having no sympathy with the people among whom 
they are mere sojourners, and upon whom they look down as inferiors; 
liable to be arrested at any moment on the most trifling charges; tried 
by military courts or submissive judges, removable at pleasure, 
punished at the discretion of the captain general, they would be less 
than men if they were contented with their yoke. But we have the 
best authority, from the most reliable sources, for asserting that 
nearly the entire native population of Cuba desires annexation. 

Apprehensions have been expressed by some southern statesmen, of 
perils resulting from the different elements composing the population, 
and the supposed mixture of races. They are not justified by the 
facts. The entire population, by the census of 1850, was 1,247,230, 
of which 605,560 were whites, 205,570 free colored, snd 436,100 slaves. 

Allowing the same annual percentage of increase for each class, as 
shown by comparison with the previous census, the total population 
now is about 1,586,000, of which 742,000 are whites, 263,000 free col- 
ored, and 581,000 slaves. There is good reason to suppose that the 
slaves considerably exceed the estimated number, it having been, until 
very recently, the interest of the proprietor to under state it. The 
feeling of caste or race, is as marked in Cuba as in the United States. 
The white Creole is as free from all taint of African blood as the de- 
scendant of the Goth on the plains of Castile. There is a numerous 
white peasantry, brave, robust, sober, and honest, not yet perhaps 
prepared intelligently to discharge all the duties of the citizen of a 
free republic, but who, from his organization physical and mental, is 
capable of being elevated by culture to the same level with the edu- 
cated Cubans, who, as a class, are as refined, well-informed, and 
fitted for self-government as men of any class of any nation can be 
who have not inhaled with their breath the atmosphere of freedom. 

Many of them accompanied by their families are to be met with 
every summer at our cities and watering places, observing and appre- 
ciating the working of our form of government and its marvelous 
results: manv seeking until the arrival of more auspicious days an 



14 ACQUISITION OF CUBA. 

asylum from the oppression that has driven them from their homes ; 
while hundreds of their youths in our schools and colleges are acquir- 
ing our language and fitting themselves hereafter, it is to be hoped, 
at no distant day, to play a distinguished part in their own legislative 
halls, or in the counsels of the nation. 

These men, who are the great proprietors of the soil, are opposed 
to the continuance of the African slave trade, which is carried on by 
Spaniards from the peninsula, renegade Americans, and other adven- 
turers from every clime and country, tolerated and protected by the 
authorities of Cuba of every grade. 

Were there a sincere desire to arrest the slave trade, it could be 
as effectually put down by Spain as it has been by Brazil. Cuba and 
Porto Rico are now the only marts for this illegal traffic; and if the 
British government had been as intent upon enforcing its treaty stip- 
ulations with Spain for its abolition as it has been in denouncing 
abuses of our flag, which we cannot entirely prevent, this question 
would long since have ceased to be a source of irritating discussion, 
it may be of possible future difficulty. Those who desire to extirpate 
the slave trade may find in their sympathy for the African a motive 
to support this bill. 

We have, since the conclusion of the Ashburton treaty in 1842, 
kept up a squadron on the coast of Africa for the suppression of the 
slave trade, and we are still bound to continue it. The annual cost 
of this squadron is at least $800,000. The cost in seventeen years 
amounts to $13,600,000, (thirteen millions six hundred thousand dol- 
lars ;) and this, too, with results absolutely insignificant. It appears, 
from a report of a select committee of the British House of Commons, 
made in March, 1850, that the number of slaves exported from Africa 
had sunk down in 1842, (the very year in which the Ashburton treaty 
was concluded,) to nearly 30,000. In 1843 it rose to 55,000. In 
1846 it was 76,000 ; in 1847 it was 84,000, and was then in a state 
of unusual activity. Sir Charles Hotham, one of the most distin- 
guished officers of the British navy, and who commanded on the coast 
of Africa for several years, was examined by that select committee. 
He said that the force under his command was in a high state of dis- 
cipline ; that his views were carried out by his officers to his entire 
satisfaction ; that, so far from having succeeded in stopping the slave 
trade, he had not even crippled it to the extent of giving it a per- 
manent check ; that the slave trade had been regulated by the com- 
mercial demand for slaves, and had been little affected by the presence 
of his squadron, and that experience had proven the system of re- 
pression by cruisers on the coast of Africa futile — this, too, when the 
British squadron counted twenty-seven vessels, comprising several 
steamers, carrying about three hundred guns and three thousand men. 
The annual expense of the squadron is about $3,500,000, with auxil- 
iary establishments on the coast costing at least $1,500,000 more — a 
total cost annually of five millions of dollars in pursuance of a system 
which experience has proved to be futile. 

In 1847 the Brazilian slave trade was in full activity. It has been 
entirely suppressed for several years. The slaves now shipped from 



ACQUISITION OF CUBA. 15 

the coast of Africa are exclusively for the Spanish islands. It is not 
easy to estimate the number. From the best data, however, it is 
supposed now to be from twenty-five to thirty thousand per year. It 
would cease to exist the moment we acquire possession of the Island 
of Cuba. 

The importation of slaves into the United States was prohibited 
in 1808. Since then, a period of more than fifty years, but one case 
has occurred of its violation — that of the Wanderer, which has re- 
cently excited so much attention. 

Another consequence which should equally enlist the sympathies 
of philanthropists, excepting that class whose tears are only shed for 
those of ebon hue, and who turn with indifference from the sufferings 
of men of any other complexion, is the suppression of the infamous 
Coolie traffic — a traffic so much the more nefarious as the Chinese is 
elevated above the African in the scale of creation; more civilized, 
more intellectual, and therefore feeling more acutely the shackles of 
the slave ship and the harsh discipline of the overseer. The num- 
ber of Chinese shipped for Cuba since the commencement of the 
traffic up to March last, is 28,777; of whom 4,134 perished on the 
passage. From that date up to the close of the year the number landed 
at Havana was 9,449. We blush to say that three-fourths of the 
number were transported under the American and British flags — under 
the flags of the two countries that have been the most zealous for the 
suppression of the African slave trade. The ratio of mortality on 
the passage was 14| per cent., and a much larger proportion of these 
wretched beings were landed in an enfeebled condition. Coming, too, 
from a temperate climate, they are not capable of enduring the expo- 
sure to the tropical sun, in which the African delights to bask. When 
their allotted time of service shall have been completed, the small 
remnant of the survivors will furnish conclusive evidence of the bar- 
barity with which they are treated. The master feels no interest in 
his temporary slave beyond that of extracting from him the greatest 
possible amount of labor during the continuance of his servitude. 
His death, or incapacity to labor at the end of his term, is to the 
master a matter of as much indifference as is the fate of the operative 
employed in his mill to the Manchester spinner. 

Another effect of this measure, which should recommend it most 
strongly to the humanitarians, will be the better treatment and 
increased happiness of the slaves now existing in the island that 
would inevitably flow from it. As a general rule, the slave is well 
treated in proportion to his productiveness and convertible value; 
as an expensive instrument is more carefully handled than one of 
less cost. When the importation of slaves from abroad is arrested, 
the home production affords the only means of supplying the in- 
creasing demand for labor. It may be assumed as an axiom of 
political economy that the increase of population, if not the only 
true test, is the most reliable of the average well-being of the 
class to which it is applied. Tried by this test, the slave of the 
United States affords a very high standard as compared even with 
the white population of our favored land. But when comparison 



16 ACQUISITION OF CUBA. 

is made with the statistics of African slavery in all European colo- 
nies, the results are startling. Since Las Casas, in his zeal for the 
protection of the Indian, originated the African slave trade, it is 
estimated that the whole number transported to the new world 
has been about 8,375,000. Of these, we, in our colonial condition, 
and since, have only received about 375,000. By natural increase, 
after deducting all who are free, we had, in 1850, 3,204,000 slaves of 
the African race. These, allowing the same per centage of increase 
for nine years, as the census returns show during the last decennial 
period, would now number over 4,300,000 ; while, from the same data, 
the free colored population would amount to 496,000. The British 
West India colonies received about 1,700,000. The whole population 
of those Islands, including Jamaica and Trinidad acquired from the 
Spaniards, and British G-uiana, black, white and mixed, is but 
1,062,639. The Spanish and other West India Islands received about 
3,000,000. This is very much more than their entire population to- 
day. The proportion may vary in some of the colonies, but the general 
result will be found everywhere the same. A very much less number 
now existing of African descent, either pure or mixed, than have been 
imported from Africa. 

There is another aspect in which this proposition may be viewed 
which is deserving of serious consideration. It is forcibly put in the 
President's annual message that the multiplied aggressions upon the 
persons and property of our citizens by the local authorities of Cuba 
for many years past present, in the person of the captain-general, the 
anomaly of absolute power to inflict injury without any corresponding 
faculty to redress it. He can, almost in sight of our shores, confiscate, 
without just cause, the property of an American citizen, or incarcerate 
his person; but if applied to for redress, we are told that he cannot 
act without consulting his royal mistress, at Madrid. There we are 
informed that it is necessary to await the return of a report of the 
case which is to be obtained from Cuba; and many years elapse before 
it is ripe for decision. These delays in most instances amount to an 
absolute denial of justice. And even when the obligation of indem- 
nity is admitted, the state of the treasury or a change of ministry is 
pleaded as an excuse for withholding payment. This would long since 
have justified us in resorting to measures of reprisal that would have 
necessarily led to war and ultimately resulted in the conquest of the 
island. Indeed such is the acute sense of those wrongs prevailing 
among our people, that nothing but our rigid neutrality laws, which, 
so long as they remain unrepealed or unmodified, a chief magistrate, 
acting under the sanction of his official oath to see that the laws be 
faithfully executed, is bound to enforce, has prevented the success 
of organized individual enterprises that would long ere this have 
revolutionized the island. It is in part, probably, for this cause 
that the President has recommended the policy which this bill em- 
bodies, and the world cannot fail to recognize in its adoption by 
Congress a determination to maintain him in his efforts to preserve 
untarnished our national character for justice and fair dealing. 

The effects of the acquisition of Cuba will be no less beneficial in its 



ACQUISITION OF CUBA. 17 

commercial, than in its political and moral aspects. The length of 
the Island is about seven hundred and seventy miles, with an average 
breadth of about forty miles, comprising an area of 31,468 square 
miles. The soil is fertile, climate genial, and its ports the finest in 
the world. Havana is more familiarly known to us, for apart from 
our extensive trade, which employs several hundred American ves- 
sels, thousands of our citizens have touched at that port in our steam- 
ers on their way to California or New Orleans. They have all carried 
away with them vivid recollections of its magnificent harbor, and 
have breathed ardent prayers that their next visit should be hailed by 
the stars and stripes floating from the Moro. And yet Cuba can 
boast of several other harbors equally safe and more extensive than 
that of Havana. 

In 1855 the importations, by official custom-house returns, were 
$31,210,000^ the exports $34,803,000. As duties are levied on exports 
as well as imports, there can be no exaggeration in these returns, and 
the real amount is undoubtedly considerably larger. 

When we consider that more than two-thirds of the whole area of 
the island is susceptible of culture, and that not a tenth part of it is 
now cultivated, we may firm some idea of the immense development 
which would l>c given to its industry by a change from a system of 
monopoly and despotism to free trade and free institutions. What- 
ever may l>c the enhanced cost of production, caused by the increased 
value of labor, it will he nearly if not quite compensated by the 
removal of export duties: and of those levied on articles produced in 
the United States, which are now by unjust discrimination virtually 
excluded from consumption. It is not possible within the limits 
which your committee have prescribed to themselves for this report 
to cite more than a few of the most important. Of flour, on an ave- 
rage of three years, from 1848 to 1850, there were imported from the 
United States. 5,642 barrels, paying a duty of $10 81 per barrel. 
From other countries, and it is believed exclusively from Spain, 
228,002 barrels, paying a duty of 82 52 per barrel, a" discrimination 
inst our flour of nearly two hundred per cent, on its present 
average value in our markets. On lard, of which the importation 
from the United State- was 10,168,000 pounds, a duty is levied of $4 
per quintal, while of olive oil 8,481,000 pounds were imported, which 
is chiefly used as its substitute, paying a duty of 87 cents per quintal. 
Of beef, dry and jerked, but 339,161 pounds were imported from 
the United States paying a duty of $1 96 per quintal, while the 
importation from other quarters, principally from Buenos Ayres, was 
30,544,000 pounds paying a duty of $1 IT. the difference being, in 
fact, a protection of the Spanish Hag which thus enjoys a monopolv 
of this branch of trade. To-day, with its increased population and 
wealth it is fair to presume that were Cuba annexed to the United 
tes, with the stimulus afforded by low prices, her annual con- 
sumption of our Hour would be 600,000 barrels; of our lard. 25,000,000 
pounds: of our beef. 20,000,000, and of pork, the most solid and 
nutritious food for the laborer 10,000,000 of pounds. The same ratio 
increase would be exhibit3d in our whole list of exports Many 
Rep. No. 351 2 



18 ACQUISITION OF CUBA. 

articles that now appear not at all or in very limited quantities would 
force their way into general consumption. The Spanish flag, deprived 
of the advantage of discriminating duties of tonnage and impost, 
would soon abandon a competition which it could not sustain on equal 
terms, and the whole carrying trade, foreign and domestic, would fall 
into the hands of our enterprising merchants and ship owners, but 
chiefly those of the northern and middle States, while the farmer of 
the west would have a new and constantly increasing market open to 
him for the products of the soil. With all the disadvantages under 
which we now labor, the American vessels entering the port of 
Havana alone last year numbered nine hundred and fifty-eight, with 
a tonnage of four hundred and three thousand four hundred and 
seventy-nine, (403,479.) To what figure will this be extended when 
ours shall be the national flag of Cuba? 

The cultivation of sugar is the chief basis of the wealth and pros- 
perity of Cuba. The average annual production, exclusive of what is 
consumed in the island, is about 400,000 tons; that of Louisiana 
about 175,000 tons. The whole amount of cane sugar from which 
Europe and the United States are supplied is estimated at 1,273,000 
tons; of this, Cuba and Louisiana now furnish somewhat more than 
45 per cent. Is it extravagant to predict that, with Cuba annexed, we 
should in a few years have as complete control of this great staple — 
which has long since ceased to be a luxury, and become almost a 
necessity of life — as we now have of cotton ? 

There is one other consideration, of minor importance when compared 
with the vast political interests involved in the question of acquisition; 
it is that of cost. Ten years past, as appears from the published 
correspondence,- our minister at Madrid was authorized to offer one 
hundred millions of dollars as the extreme price for the purchase of 
Cuba. If that was its value then, something may be added to it 
now. Assuming it to be twenty-five millions more, the annual inter- 
est, without reference to the probable premium which would be 
realized from a loan, bearing five per cent, interest, would be 
($6,250,000) six million two hundred and fifty thousand dollars. 
Of the imposts of ($31,216,000) thirty-one millions two hun- 
dred and sixteen thousand dollars in 1856, your committee have 
not before them the means of ascertaining the proportion coming 
from the United States. From the summary of Balanzas Generales 
from 1848 to 1854, in the report of Commercial Relations, vol. 1, page 
187, it may, however, be fairly assumed to be somewhat more than 
one-fourth, or about eight millions of dollars. This proportion would 
doubtless be largely increased. Admitting it to be ($16,216,000) 
sixteen millions two hundred and sixteen thousand dollars, it would 
leave a balance of (§15,000,000) fifteen millions of dollars on which 
duties could be levied. Under our present tariff the average rate of 
duties is about 18-| per cent; but as the articles on our free list are of 
very limited consumption in Cuba, the average there would be at 
least 20 per cent. This would yield a revenue from customs of 
($3,000,000) three millions of dollars. But under the stimulus of 
free trade and free institutions, with the removal of many burdens 
from the consumer, it would necessarily be greatly and speedily 



ACQUISITION OF CUBA. 19 

augmented. It would be a moderate calculation to say that 
in two years it would reach lour millions of dollars ($4,000,000.) 
On the other hand, it may he said that our expenditure would be 
largely increased. Such is not the opinion of your committee. On 
the contrary, it is believed that from the greater security of 
our foreign relations, resulting from the settlement of this long 
agitated and disturbing question, our naval expenditure might be 
safely reduced, while no addition to our military establishment 
would be required. It has already been shown that an annual 
Baving of eight hundred thousand dollars ($800,000) maybe effected 
by withdrawing the African Bquadron, when its services will no longer 
be necessary. Thus our expenditure for the interest on the debt 
incurred by the acquisition would be credited by four million eight hun- 
dred thousand dollars, ($4,800,000,) leaving an annual balance of but 
one million four hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars (Si, 425, 000) 
to the debit of the purchase. Is this sum to be weighed in the bal- 
ance with the advantages, political and commercial, which would 
result from it? Your committee think that it should not. 

A lew words on the wealth and resources of Cuba, and your com- 
mittee will close this report, which has swollen to dimensions not 
incommensurate with the importance of the subject, but which, it 
may he feared, will, under the pressure of other business during this 
short session, be considered as unduly trespassing on the attention of 
the Senate'. The amount of taxes that can be levied upon any people, 
without paralyzing their industry and arresting their material progress, 
is the experimentum cruets of the fertility of the land they inhabit. 
Tried by this test, Cuba will favorably compare with any country on 
either side of the Atlantic. 

Your committee have before them the last Cuban Budget, which 
presents the actual receipts and expenditures for one year, with the 
estimates for the same for the next six months. The income derived 
from direct taxes, customs, monopolies, lotteries, &c, is sixteen mil- 
lion three hundred and three thousand nine hundred and fifty dollars, 
($16,303,950.) The expenses are sixteen million two hundred and 
ninety-nine thousand six hundred and sixty-three dollars, ($16, 299, 663.) 
This equilibrium of the Budget is accounted for by the fact that 
the surplus revenue is remitted to Spain. It figures under the 
head of •■ Atcnciones de la Peninsula" and amounts to ($1,404,059,) 
one million four hundred and four thousand and fifty-nine dollars, 
and is the only direct pecuniary advantage Spain derives from the 
possession of Cuba, and even this sum very much exceeds the average 
net revenue remitted from that island, all the expenses of the army 
and navy employed at or near Cuba being paid by the island. The 
disbursements are those of the general administration of the island, 
those of Havana and other cities being provided for by special 
imposts and taxes. 

It may be moderately estimated that the personal exactions of 
Spanish' officials amount to five millions of dollars ($5,000,000) per 
annum, thus increasing the expenses of the government of Cuba, 
apart from those which, with us. would be considered as county or 



20 



ACQUISITION OF CUBA. 



municipal, to the enormous sum of twenty-one million three hundred 
thousand dollars, ($21,300,000,) or about thirteen dollars and fifty 
cents ($13 50) per head for the whole population of the island, free 
and slave. Under this system of government and this excessive taxa- 
tion the population has, for a series of years, steadily increased at the 
mean rate of three per cent, per annum, about equal to that of the 
United States. 

Since the reference of the bill to the committee, the President, in 
response to a resolution of the Senate requesting him, if not incom- 
patible with the public interest, to communicate to the Senate any 
and all correspondence between the government of the United States 
and the government of her Catholic Majesty relating to any propo- 
sition for the purchase of the island of Cuba, which correspondence 
has not been furnished to either House of Congress, informs us that 
no such correspondence has taken place which has not already been 
communicated to Congress. He takes occasion to repeat what he 
said in his annual message, that it is highly important, if not indis- 
pensable to the success of any negotiation for the purchase, that the 
measure should receive the previous sanction of Congress. 

This emphatic reiteration of his previous recommendation throws 
upon Congress the responsibility of failure if withheld. Indeed, the 
inference is sufficiently clear that, without some expression of opinion 
by Congress, the President will not feel justified in renewing negotia- 
tions. 

The committee beg leave to append hereto various tables concerning 
statistical details of matters treated of in this report. 

All which is respectfully submitted. 



No. 1. 

Commerce of the Island of Cuba with foreign nations for the years 1852, 
1853, and 1854, made up from the " general balances." 

[Frcm Ex. Doc. No. 107, 1st session 34th Congress, Commercial Relations of the United States.] 



Sountries. 



Spain ............... 

United States 

England 

France 

Germany. .... 

Belgium 

Spanish America 

Portugal and Brazil. . 

Holland... 

Denmark 

Russia . . . 

Sweden and Norway. 

Austria 

Italy 

Deposit 



Total 

Add for Prussia. 



Imports. 



$10,200,429 
6,552.585 
5,638,824 
2,203,354 
1,102,002 
493,908 
2,144,618 



213,386 
657,554 



27,783 



32,309 
483,486 



29,780,242 



Exports. 



$3,882,634 

12,076,408 

5,486,677 

1,513,368 

1,690,165 

321,260 

801, 160 



297,152 

864, 366 
483,218 
15,489 
241,458 
380, 586 



27,453,936 



1853. 



Imports. 



.$7,756,905 
6,799,732 
6,195,921 
2,177,222 
1,115,940 
998,511 
1,677,476 



88,876 
485,422 



47,756 



69,022 
377,011 



27,789,800 



Exports. 



$3,298,871 

12,131,095 

8,322,195 

3,293,389 

1,474,018 

466,306 

514,831 



246,661 
403,085 
253,688 
16,309 
138,035 
651,275 



31,210,405 



1854. 



Imports. 



*9, 057, 428 

7,867,680 

6,610,909 

2,558,198 

1,420,639 

635,886 

2,145,370 

16,215 

194,390 

538, 824 



14,076 



24, 082 
310,865 



31,394,578 



Exports^. 



$3,615,692 

11,641,813 

11,119,526 

1,921,567 

1,824,074 

'811,880 

671,380 

14,186 

251,482 

309,949 



23,694 
168,453 
313, 779 



32,683,731 
5,258 



ACQUISITION OF CUBA. 21 



No-. 2. 

Statement of the aggregate of revenue and expenditure of the Island of 

C\iba. 

EBV*.. V ' IB. 

Section 1. — Contributions and imports $3, 026,833 69 

8ection 2.— Customs - 9,807,878 87 

8ection 3. — Taxes and monopolies 1,069,795 44 

8ection 4.— Lotteries ' =6,719,200 00 

Section 5.— State property 119,285 94 

Section 6. — Contingencies 595,928 94 

21,338,928 88 

Deduct for sums paid as portions of the forfeitures under seizures. 12, 972 88 

Actaal total 21,325,956 00 



EXPENDITURK. 

Section 1 — Grace and justice $712,755 00 

Section 2.— War 5,866,538 36 

Section 3.— Exchequer 7,645,145 43 

Sflrf i i Ordinary expenses - 2,386,634 16 

' j Extraordinary expenses - - -- 1,190,700 37 

Section 5. — Executive department - 2, 115,833 12 

Section 6. — Attentions (remittances) of the peninsula 1,404,059 00 



Total - 21,321,665 44 



° From this sum should be deducted $5, 022, 000, which figures among the expenditures 
of the exchequer under the government guaranty of prizes in the lotteries, and which is 
included in the sum of $7, 645, 145 43 set down as expended by that department. This 
leaves a net revenue from that source of $1, 697, 200, and a total net revenue of $16, 105 96. 



22 



ACQUISITION OF JTJBA. 






fa 

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ACQUISITION OF CUBA. 



23 



No. 4. 
Table of the tovd production of sugar, consumption, &c. 

Ton*. 

Cane sugar .. 1 2,057,653 

Palm sugar 100,000 

Beet-root sugar 164, 822 

Maple sugar .'• • - % 20,247 

Total 2, 342, 722 



But the quantity of sugar from which the United States, England, 
Europe, and "the Mediterranean is to be supplied reaches only 
1,273,000 tons. Thus, for the 300,000,000 souls who are dependent 
on it, it gives but about eight pounds per head, while the consump- 
tion in England is triple that quantity, and in the United States 
twenty pounds per head. The use of sugar in the world is rapidly 
increasing. In France it has doubled in thirty years. It has in- 
creased more than fifty per cent, in England in fifteen years. In the 
Zollverein it has quadrupled. The following table will show the 
imports and production of sugar in Great Britain, France, and the 
United States, during many years : 

Consumption of sugar in Great Britain, France, and United States. 



Tears. 



1841 . 
181-2 . 
1843. 
1814 , 
1815. 
1846 . 
1647 . 
1818. 
1819. 

1850 . 

1851 . 

1852 . 
1853. 
1854 . 
1855. 
1856. 
1857 . 



Sugar duty puid in France. 



Colonial. Foreign. Beet root. Total 



Ton*. 

74,515 

77.443 

79,455 

87,382 

90,958 

78.632 

B7,fc26 

48,371 

63,335 

50,996 



32,030 
38,841 

40,113 
45.373 

46,767 
42,466 



Tons. 

i-2.ii;-; 
8,210 
9,695 
10,2*9 
11,542 
15,185 
9,626 
9,540 
18,979 
23,862 



14,882 
15.041 
18,943 
49,822 
16.4S6 
25,689 



Tons. 
27, 162 
35,070 
29,155 
32, 075 
35,132 
46,e45 
52, 369 
48,103 
43,793 
67,297 
74,999 
67. 145 
87, 120 
85, 825 
5-2. 90-2 
95, 103 
1 13-2, 000 



Tons. 
114.719 
11(1.7-2;! 
118,215 
129,026 
137,632 
140.662 
149,8-21 
116,014 
126, 107 
142,155 



11 1,357 

13% 005 
144.981 
1 18,097 
158,326 
200. 155 



Great 
Britain. 



Tons. 
203, -200 
193,fc23 
204.016 
2(16,000 
242,831 
261,932 
290,275 
309, 424 
299, ni I 
310,391 
3-29.715 
360, 720 
380,488 
475,095 
384,231 
397, 44M 
367,476 



United States 



Foreign. 



Tons. 

65,601 

69,474 

28,854 

83,801 

88. 336 

44,974 

98,410 

114.21 1 

103,121 

84,813 

190, 1 y:i 

2-28,772 

232,213 

2-27.982 

2:'6,9i2 

272.631 

388,501 



Louisiana 



Tons. 
38,000 
39,200 
64.360 
44; 400 
45,000 
83,028 
71,i-40 
107,000 
99, 180 
110.600 
102,000 
118,273 
160,967 
224,662 
173.317 
115,713 
o6,933 



Tons. 
103,606 
10?, 674 

93,214 
128,206 
133,316 
128,002 
169.450 
211.214 
202.301 
194,413 
29-2, 193 
347,045 
393,180 
452,614 
410,259 
388,3-14 
425,434 



Average 
amount. 



Per cent. 
49.58 
45.42 
42.30 
41.82 
40.40 
41.85 
34.95 
29.40 
31.00 
32.22 
32.32 
28.00 
30. 72 



To close of February. 



The production of beet-root sugar in France was for four years as 

follows : 

No. working. Kilos. 

1854 303 77,848,208 

1855 208 50,180.864 

1856 275 91,003,098 

1857 341 132,000,000 



24 



ACQUISITION OF CUBA. 



The figures for 1857 are only to March 1, and exceed by 54,000,000 

kilogrammes the product of last year. The' production in the Zoll- 

verein in 1855 was as follows : 

- L Cwt. 

Prussia 14,099 



Anhalt ..... 
Bavaria •'.... 
Saxony 

Wurtemburg 



2,301 

247 
131 
603 



iesse • • • 
luringen 
Irunswicl? 



59 

122 
634 



,263 
,364 
,126 
,968 
,256 
,825 
,137 
,965 
,496 



Giving a total of 19,188,402. The increase in the consumption is 
immense. In 1841 the total for the three countries above named was 
420,000 tons. This has increased to 800,000 tons, or a quantity nearly 
doubled, and the supply has come from Louisiana and from beet roots; 
the former failed considerably in the last two years, and, as a conse- 
quence, nearly convulsed the world. The value of sugar in the open 
market, then, seems to depend upon the precarious crop of Louisiana, 
since, when that fails, the prices rise all over the world. — U. 8. 
Economist. 



No. 5. 



Table of number of 



linese skipped from 
23, 1858. 



China from 1847 to March 



The following table, 



rived from a reliable source, exhibits the 
total number of vessels that have arrived at this port since 1847 with 
Asiatics ; their flags, tonnage, number of Asiatics shipped and landed, 
number and per centage of deaths, &c. , which, I think, will not be 

deemed uninteresting: 



Flags of vessels. 


a 

s 

3 


6D 

a 

a 
c 

o 


5 T3 

c a. 

B hi 


•a 

a 


■S 
Q 


o 

CD 

g c3 
t>TJ 

CD 

04 




13 

29 

8 

7 
5 

i 
1 
1 


13,545 

21,275 

5,003 

6,037 

2,038 

1,246 

2,484 

560 

470 

250 


6,744 
10,791 

2,773 

3,655 

1,779 

1,049 

1,314 

249 

221 

202 


5,929 

9,205 

2,463 

3,154 

1,489 

1,021 

812 

236 

179 

155 


815 

1,586 

310 

501 

290 

28 

502 

13 

42 

47 


12 
14$ 

13$ 

Hi 

2$ 

38 1 






5s- 
19 
23£ , 


Total.... ............ 


71 


53,008 


28,777 


24,643 


4,134 


14$ 

















ACQUISITION OF CUBA. 25 

From the foregoing it will be seen that the loss of life on the total 
Dumber Bhipped actually amounts to 14§ per cent.; and whilst the 

number of deaths of those brought hither in Portuguese ships amounts 
to only 2J per cent., the number brought in American ships amount 
to 12 per cent., in British ships to 14| per cent., and in French ships 
to 13| per cent., whilst in Peruvian ships the number of deaths 
amounts to 3S£ per cent. 



No. 6. 

Population of the West Indies, as stated in Cotton's Atlas of the World, 

volume 1. 

Hayti — Haytien empire 572, DO 

Dominican republic 136, 000 

Cuba (slaves 330,425) 1,009,060 

Porto Rico 447,914 

French islands — Guadalupe and dependencies 154,975 

Martinique.... 121,478 

Freuch Guiana 22, 110 

St. Bartholomew 9,000 

Danish islands — St. Thomas 13,666 

Santa Cruz 23,729 

St. John 2,228 

39,623 

Dutch islands— Curaeoa, &c 28,497 

Dutch Guiana 61,080 

British islands — Bahamas. 27,519 

Turk's island 4,428 

Jamaica 377, 433 

Caymans 1,760 

Trinidad* 68,645 

Tobago 13,208 

Granada 32,671 

St. Vincent 30, 12S 

Barbadoes 135,939 

St. Lucia 24,516 

Dominica 22,061 

Montsercat 7, 653 

Antigua 37, 757 

St. Christopher's - 23,177 

Nevis 9,601 

Barbuda 1,707 

Anguilla 3,052 

Virgin islands -- 6, 689 

British Guiana 127,695 

963, 639 



Total 3,575,370 

c Acquired from Spain. 



Rep. Xo. 351- 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



015 817 983 § 



